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Differential Diagnosis or Distortion?
By GARY SLOBODA*
THE CONCEPT OF disease diagnosis is fundamental not only to the
practice of medicine but also to the practice of many areas of the law.
While "establishing a diagnosis is one of the physician's most basic
tasks [,] .. .which affects the organization and functioning of the en-
tire health care system,"1 the diagnosis of disease plays an important
role in non-therapeutic contexts as well-shaping certain anti-discrim-
ination laws and determining the success or failure of tort lawsuits. 2
"Diagnostic judgments have become so pervasive and readily accepted
in these varied contexts that we may lose sight of their overall signifi-
cance."3 One commentator recently argued that as the concepts of
disease and diagnosis extend outside the area of the patient-doctor
relationship, "closer scrutiny of the diagnostic process is warranted. '4
Indeed, where non-medical decision-makers, such as government
agencies, politicians, and judges, use diagnosis for non-therapeutic
purposes, new constructs are devised to fit these various forums
outside clinical medicine. 5 Detaching the diagnostic process from the
therapeutic perspective can result in a distortion of the diagnostic pro-
cess, particularly when medical diagnosis is directed not at healing,
but at persuasion and/or profit.6
In the area of tort litigation, the use of diagnosis to prove injuries
and causation is routine.7 In fact, without the use of diagnosis in tort
actions, many plaintiffs' causes of action would be almost impossible
* J.D., Santa Clara University (2000); M.A., B.A., University of Nevada, Las Vegas
(1996, 1994).
1. MICHAEL L. GLENN, ON DIAGNOSIS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH xvii (1984).
2. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 2-3 (3d
ed. 1997).
3. Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 241, 242 (1999).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 242-43 (noting that in some situations diagnosis is used to advocate
policy and validate complaints).
6. See id. at 243 (noting that where non-medical decision-makers drive the diagnostic
process, legitimate concerns arise about the integrity of the medical profession and the
costs to society).
7. See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1998).
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to sustain.8 Thus, although the diagnostic process may be distorted,
the continued use of diagnosis in tort actions is crucial to providing a
remedy for injured plaintiffs. Therefore, a careful balancing of the
varied implications of using diagnostic testimony in tort litigation is
necessary. The interests of plaintiffs in being able to prove their causes
of action through diagnostic evidence should be weighed against the
interest of imposing strict safeguards on the introduction of scientifi-
cally unreliable diagnostic testimony.
A great body of law dealing with the introduction of diagnostic
testimony has evolved over the last half century.9 Although the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence10 and case law attempt to clarify the issue, many
unresolved questions remain, particularly in the area of toxic tort and
product liability litigation. In these types of lawsuits, the exclusion of
medical or expert testimony often determines the entire case. In the
Ninth Circuit, in particular, the issue of diagnostic testimony is most
troublesome with regard to the use of a "differential diagnosis"' 1 to
prove causation. Therefore, this Article focuses on cases within the
Ninth Circuit involving differential diagnosis and examines relevant
cases in other circuits, including a discussion of the therapeutic use of
differential diagnosis and its utility in proving causation. This Article
promotes a reading of those cases which will provide a way to deal
with differential diagnosis causation issues in federal courts by (1)
eliminating the requirement of general causation1 2 in a differential
diagnosis situation, and (2) with regard to specific causation,' 3 height-
ening the level of interrogation of the differential diagnostic process
at each step of the diagnosis.
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., FED. R. EvIo. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence and not the test from Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), set the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence
in federal court); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the basic
standard for admissibility of scientific evidence).
10. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
11. For a description of differential diagnosis, see infra notes 14-16 and accompany-
ing text.
12. General causation refers to whether the substance or object alleged to have
caused injury could cause such harm to any individual. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1412-13 (D. Or. 1996).
13. Specific causation refers to whether the substance or object actually caused the
injury to the particular plaintiff. See id. at 1413.
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I. Background
A. Differential Diagnosis and Its Medical Utility
Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, "is a patient-spe-
cific process of elimination" used to identify the cause of a medical
problem by eliminating possible causes until the most probable cause
is isolated.' 4 A differential diagnosis is typically made after the per-
formance of "physical examinations, the taking of medical histories,
and the review of clinical tests, including laboratory tests."1 5 A differ-
ential diagnosis is accomplished by considering the possible causes of
a patient's problem and eliminating each of the potential causes "un-
til reaching one that cannot be ruled out or determining which of
those that cannot be excluded is the most likely."1 6 Some courts have
noted the widespread acceptance and general reliability of differential
diagnosis in the doctor-patient relationship. For example, in In re Paoli
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,1 7 the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit noted that differential diagnosis "has widespread acceptance in
the medical community, has been subject to peer review, and does not
frequently lead to incorrect results."1 8 Similarly, in Heller v. Shaw In-
dustries, Inc.,19 the same court noted that differential diagnosis "'con-
sists of a testable hypothesis,' has been peer reviewed, contains
standards for controlling its operation, is generally accepted, and is
used outside of the judicial context."20
However, the use of a differential diagnosis for therapeutic or
healing purposes differs from its use in tort litigation. The purpose of
clinical medicine is not theoretical understanding; rather, the aim of
14. Id. (explaining that differential diagnosis is used by "medical practitioners... to
identify the 'most likely' cause of a set of signs and symptoms from a list of possible
causes").
15. Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 807 (3d Cir. 1997).
16. Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Kan-
nankeril, 128 F.3d at 807 (explaining that "[d]ifferential diagnosis is defined for physicians
as the 'the determination of which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the
one from which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of the
clinical findings"' (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 428 (25th ed. 1990))); McCul-
lock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that differential etiology
or diagnosis is an analysis "which requires listing possible causes, then eliminating all
causes but one"); Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1994)
(describing differential diagnosis as "a standard diagnostic tool used by medical profession-
als to diagnose the most likely cause or causes of illness, injury or disease").
17. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
18. Id. at 758.
19. 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
20. Id. at 154-55 (quoting Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8).
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clinical medicine is "the practical goal of therapy, though it uses
whatever theoretical science is available." 21 Historically, "diagnostic
perfectionism differed a great deal from one disease to another ....
[I]n situations where no reasonable treatment was available and
where the condition had little effect on life, diagnostic utility would be
low and accuracy would be relatively unimportant. " 22 Earlier in the
century, for example, when diseases such as tuberculosis and lung
cancer were untreatable, "a vague diagnosis of chest disease may have
been satisfactory" because effective treatment did not depend on cer-
tainty about a patient's condition. 23
Although medical and scientific knowledge has advanced signifi-
cantly in the twentieth century, making medical diagnosis more pre-
cise, the process of differential diagnosis remains "a mixture of
science and art, far too complicated for its accuracy to be assessed
quantitatively or for a meaningful rate of error to be calculated." 24
The use of a differential diagnosis for the purpose of therapy only
"follow[s] the causal stream up to a point where intervention is possi-
ble" because, typically, physicians "do not care about the disease's eti-
ology-the theory of its origin or cause-unless understanding
causation would assist in diagnosis and treatment." 25 Therefore, inher-
ent differences exist between the utilization of a differential diagnosis
in the clinical setting and its use in the tort arena. Indeed, this tension
is indicative of a larger evidentiary problem: How should courts use
expert testimony and to what degree should courts pass judgment on
the methods and conclusions of medical and scientific professionals?
As discussed below, case law and scholarship over the last century have
addressed this dilemma from many perspectives. 26 As a result, over the
last decade, a new and relatively flexible standard based on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence has emerged. 27
21. Ernan McMullin, Diagnosis by Computer, in LOGIC OF DISCOVERY AND DIAGNOSIS IN
MEDICINE 199, 218 (Kenneth F. Schaffner ed., 1985).
22. JOHN I. BALLA, THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS: A MODEL FOR CLINICAL TEACHERS 54
(1985).
23. Id. at 95.
24. John M. Conley & John B. Garver, Il, William C. Keady and the Law of Scientific
Evidence, 68 Miss. L.J. 39, 51 (1998).
25. Herbert A. Simon, Artificial-Intelligence Approaches to Problem Solving and Clinical Di-
agnosis, in LOGIC OF DISCOVERY AND DIAGNOSIS IN MEDICINE, supra note 21, at 72, 87.
26. See discussion infra Part I.B.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 594
& n.12 (1993).
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B. The Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony in Federal
Courts
Before 1993, the "Frye test" governed the admissibility of scientific
testimony in a majority ofjurisdictions in the United States.28 In Frye v.
United States,29 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held a criminal defendant's exculpatory lie detector test inadmissi-
ble and established a new standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence: "[T]he thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs."30 Therefore, in deciding on the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence, judges were required to determine
whether "the expert's methods [were] generally accepted in the rele-
vant scientific community."31 However, in Frye, the court admitted that
the standard of general acceptance was vague and existed somewhere
in the "twilight zone" between experimental and demonstrable scien-
tific principles or discoveries.3 2 Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court later recognized the proliferation of scholarship and debate en-
gendered by the application of Frye's inherently vague standard. 33
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.34 In Daubert, the Court held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702") superceded the traditional Frye
test.3 5 Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 3 6
Therefore, the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal
courts depends on a two-pronged inquiry. The evidence must be: (1)
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will (2) aid
the trier of fact to understand or resolve a fact in contention. 37 The
28. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the
standard for expert scientific testimony is general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community).
29. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
30. Id. at 1014.
31. Conley & Garver, supra note 24, at 41.
32. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1993).
34. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
35. See id. at 587, 589.
36. FED. R. EVID. 702.
37. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260
(4th Cir. 1999).
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first prong of this admissibility test, sometimes referred to as the "reli-
ability" prong, "necessitates an examination of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the expert's proffered opinion is relia-
ble-that is, whether it is supported by adequate validation to render
it trustworthy." 38 The Daubert Court, although "not presum [ing] to set
out a definitive checklist or test,"39 identified some factors that trial
judges should consider when they examine the reasoning and meth-
odology behind scientific testimony: (1) whether a theory or scientific
technique can be and has been tested;40 (2) whether the work or
scholarship the expert relies on has been subjected to peer review;41
(3) in cases relying on scientific techniques, "the known or potential
rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards con-
trolling the technique's operation";42 and (4) whether the work or
scholarship relied upon has garnered widespread acceptance in the
scientific community.43
The second prong of the Rule 702 admissibility test concerns the
relevance of the evidence to the facts in contention. 44 The Supreme
Court characterized this relevancy requirement as a question of "fit,"4 5
which "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry
as a precondition to admissibility. '46 In short, the question of "fit" ad-
dresses whether the proffered evidence provides useful information
about a particular contested fact.4 7
Further, the Daubert Court specifically noted that in undertaking
the "flexible" Rule 702 inquiry,48 trial judges are to focus "solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gener-
ate."'49 This charge has proven easier in theory than in application.
Two subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions, General Elec-
tric Co. v. Joinery° and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,51 addressed
the difficulty judges face when they reject a particular expert's meth-
38. Westbeny, 178 F.3d at 260 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 & n.9).
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 593-94.
42. Id. at 594.
43. See id. (folding in the general acceptance standard of Frye).
44. See id. at 591.
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 592.
47. See id. at 591.
48. Id. at 594 n.12.
49. Id. at 595.
50. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
51. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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odology without passing judgment on the expert's results. Signifi-
cantly, the Court in Joiner encouraged judges to consider whether "too
great an analytic gap" exists between the underlying research and the
expert's conclusion itself.52 Joiner apparently serves as an extension of
Daubert's judicial "gatekeeping" function. 53 Under Joiner, trial judges,
charged with the responsibility of ensuring the relevance and reliabil-
ity of scientific evidence, are given further license to pass judgment on
experts' conclusions if they appear unreliable in light of the underly-
ing data.54 In addition, Joiner held that a trial judge's decision to ex-
clude scientific evidence should be reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard,55 making it less likely that the decision will be
reversed on appeal.
Similarly, in Kumho, the Court further submitted the question of
evidentiary reliability to the discretion of the trial judge.5 6 Kumho re-
solved a conflict among the circuits and extended the use of the
Daubert criteria to testimony based on specialized knowledge in gen-
eral, notjust scientific testimony.57 The Court also stated that the trial
judge may or may not consider one or more of the Daubert reliability
factors "depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular
experience, and the subject of his testimony."58 Therefore, taken to-
gether, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho provide a relatively flexible frame-
work in which to examine the role of trial judges in excluding or
including scientific evidence in federal courtrooms.
The analytical framework established by the Supreme Court over
the last several years has the potential to lead to inconsistent or even
unfair results. This is due, in part, to the Court's desire to give trial
judges broad discretion regarding the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. In application, results will differ based on a particular trial
judge's sensibilities and perceptions of the scientific process. In addi-
tion, the Court's fine distinction between scientific "methodology"
and "results" often is, in practice, a non-distinction. For example,
where a judge rejects an expert's testimony based on an "analytical
gap" between an expert's data and conclusions, that judge effectively
appraises the validity of the expert's results and opinion, a determina-
52. Id. at 146.
53. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 597; see also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42.
54. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47.
55. See id. at 139.
56. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
57. See id. at 141, 147-49.
58. Id. at 150.
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tion specifically proscribed in Daubert.59 However, as discussed below,
in the case of the admissibility of an expert's testimony based upon a
differential diagnosis, an analytical construct that fits within the Su-
preme Court's Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho parameters is available; such
a construct neither renders the practical distinction between "meth-
odology" and "results" meaningless nor prevents trial judges from ef-
fectively ensuring that only reliable scientific testimony is admitted.60
11. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based on a
Differential Diagnosis in Federal Courts Outside
the Ninth Circuit
A. Third and Fourth Circuits Lower the Threshold for
Admissibility
A number of federal courts of appeal have specifically approved
the admissibility of scientific and medical testimony based on a valid
differential diagnosis. 61 At least five circuits have concluded that medi-
cal testimony based upon a differential diagnosis is admissible to
prove causation. 62 Such evidence typically is offered to prove that a
particular condition, product, chemical, or substance caused the
plaintiff's injuries. 63 Indeed, if the differential diagnosis evidence was
not admitted by the trial judge in those cases, the plaintiffs would have
been unable to prove causation, and their causes of action would have
failed. 64 Although similar in factual and procedural posture, the cases
involved differing kinds of diagnostic data, in terms of quality and
quantity, upon which the expert testimony was based.65 Therefore, the
59. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
60. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1099 (1999).
61. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999); Westberry v.
Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262-66 (4th Cir. 1999); Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claim-
ants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1998); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381,
387 (2d Cir. 1998); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
62. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 154-55; Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262-66; Baker, 156 F.3d at
252-53; Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385-87; Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 140-41.
63. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 154; Westbeny, 178 F.3d at 262-66; Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 387;
Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 140-41.
64. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 151-52; Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262-66; Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at
385-86; Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 140-41.
65. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 153-54, 158 (testimony of allergist and industrial hygienist as
to whether organic compounds in carpeting caused plaintiffs respiratory problems based
on tests before and after removal of carpet, a series of medical tests, review of medical
history, descriptions of plaintiff's activities and environmental living conditions, and tem-
poral relationship between onset of symptoms and installation of carpet); Westbeny, 178
F.3d at 264-66 (testimony of expert as to whether talc caused sinus condition based on
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manner in which the different circuits have evaluated the reliability of
a particular expert's differential diagnosis under Daubert and its prog-
eny is crucial to understanding the admissibility of differential diagno-
ses in federal courts in general. Furthermore, an analysis of the
leading cases on the subject illustrates the potential benefits and pit-
falls of a wholesale acceptance of differential diagnosis as a reliable
methodology for proving causation in complex tort litigation.
Westbeny v. Gislaved Gummi AB66 involved a tort action brought by
a factory worker against Gislaved Gummi AB ("GGAB") based on
GGAB's failure to warn of the danger of a talcum powder lubricant it
placed on the rubber gaskets it manufactured. 67 The trial in the dis-
trict court resulted in ajury verdict for the plaintiff.6s GGAB appealed,
claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the ex-
pert testimony of the plaintiffs treating physician. 69 GGAB argued
that the testimony of the plaintiffs physician concerning the causal
connection between the plaintiffs exposure to the talcum powder
and the plaintiffs sinus problems "was inadmissible because it was not
based on reliable scientific methodology. '70 In particular, GGAB con-
tended that the physician's testimony was unreliable because it was
not supported by epidemiological studies, peer-reviewed published
studies, animal studies, or laboratory data. 71 In short, GGAB argued
that the physician's mere reliance on a differential diagnosis in reach-
ing the conclusion that the plaintiff's sinus problems were caused by
his exposure to talc from GGAB's gaskets was insufficient to establish
the reliability of the physician's opinion. 72 The Fourth Circuit rejected
evidence of exposure, undisputed evidence that high concentrations of airborne talc could
cause irritation to mucous membranes, temporal proximity of exposure and worsening of
symptoms, and ruling out other potential causes); Baker, 156 F.3d at 249-50 (testimony of
two expert gynecologists that pelvic inflammatory disease caused plaintiff's chlamydia
based on blood analysis); Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385-86 (testimony of physician and phar-
macologist as to whether Danocrine caused primary pulmonary hypertension based upon
temporal relationship between Danocrine overdose and onset of symptoms and reliance
on articles); Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 138-41 (testimony of expert epidemiologist and teratol-
ogist as to whether Depo-Provera caused plaintiff's birth defects based on unspecified epi-
demiological data and scholarship).
66. 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
67. See id. at 259-60.
68. See id. at 260.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 262.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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GGAB's arguments and held that "a reliable differential diagnosis pro-
vides a valid foundation for an expert opinion. '73
The real import of the Westbeny decision lies not in the broad
validation of differential diagnosis as a reliable methodology for pur-
poses of admissibility, but in the court's specific analysis of the physi-
cian's differential diagnosis. Essentially, the court addressed two steps
of the diagnosis that GGAB argued negated reliability: (1) the lack of
scholarship and data "'rul[ing] in' talc as a possible basis for [the
plaintiff's] sinus condition,"74 and (2) the failure of the physician to
"rule out" other potential causes of the plaintiffs sinus condition.75
On the issue of "ruling in" talc as a possible cause of the plaintiffs
injuries, the Fourth Circuit stated that, "[a] lthough GGAB is correct
that [the physician] had no scientific literature on which to rely to
'rule in' talc as a possible basis for [the plaintiffs] sinus condition,"76
the fact that the plaintiff's own testimony provided evidence of a sub-
stantial exposure, combined with the "temporal proximity of [the
plaintiff's] exposure to talc in his workplace to the onset and worsen-
ing of [his] sinus problems,"77 constituted valid support for "ruling in"
talc as a causal agent of the injuries.78
On the issue of "ruling out" other potential causes, the court in
Westberry noted that "[a] differential diagnosis that fails to take serious
account of other potential causes may be so lacking that it cannot
provide a reliable basis for an opinion on causation. '7 9 Yet the Fourth
Circuit went on to state that "' [a] medical expert's causation conclu-
sion should not be excluded because he or she has failed to rule out
every possible alternative cause of a plaintiffs illness."' 80 The court
concluded that the other potential causes of the plaintiff's sinus con-
dition "'affect the weight that the jury should give the expert's testi-
mony and not the admissibility of that testimony,' unless the expert
can offer 'no explanation for why she concluded [an alternative cause]
was not the sole cause."' 81 Furthermore, the appellate court noted
that the testimony of the plaintiffs physician on cross-examination ex-
73. Id. at 263.
74. Id. at 264.
75. See id. at 265-66.
76. Id. at 264.
77. Id. at 265.
78. See id. at 264-65.
79. Id. at 265 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758-61 (3d Cir.
1994)).
80. Id. (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999)) (altera-
tion in original).
81. Id. (quoting Heler, 167 F.3d at 156-57) (alterations in original).
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plained why the physician "did not believe that the cold.., developed
[near the onset of plaintiff's symptoms] or the water skiing he did
over that summer accounted for his sinus problems."82 Therefore,
with a differential diagnosis, an expert may establish that a particular
substance could have caused a plaintiffs injuries merely by an exami-
nation of the patient that takes into account: (1) the fact of exposure;
(2) the proximity in time between exposure and the onset of symp-
toms; and (3) a ruling out of other potential causes, after physical
examinations and/or testing.83
In Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc.,8 4 the Third Circuit likewise vali-
dated the use of differential diagnosis, but with less sweeping lan-
guage. 85 In Heller, the court reviewed the district court's exclusion of
the plaintiffs expert medical testimony on the issue of causation.8 6
The expert attempted to link organic compounds in the defendant's
carpet to the plaintiffs respiratory illness.87 The court of appeals ini-
tially found that the district court "was too restrictive in requiring [the
plaintiffs] medical expert to rely on published studies specifically
linking [the plaintiff's] illness with [the defendant's] product, and in
requiring [the] medical expert to rule out all alternative possible
causes of [the] illness. '88 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the district court
properly excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs expert on the basis
of "a flawed temporal relationship between the installation of the car-
pet and the presence of [the plaintiffs] illness."8 9
The Heller decision, issued one month prior to Westbeny, confirms
the Westberry analysis of the quality of a differential diagnosis offered
to prove causation on three issues. First, in regard to general causa-
tion, the lack of published studies relied on by the expert is not
enough to exclude an expert's testimony based upon a differential
diagnosis.90 Second, with respect to specific causation, the failure to
"rule out" all other potential causes may not be enough to render an
expert's testimony based upon a differential diagnosis inadmissible. 91
82. Id. at 266.
83. See id. at 264-66.
84. 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
85. See id. at 154-55.
86. See id. at 149-50.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 149.
89. Id. at 149-50.
90. See id. at 154-56; see also Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264-65
(4th Cir. 1999).
91. See Heler, 167 F.3d at 156-57; see also Westbery, 178 F.3d at 265.
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Finally, a temporal relationship between exposure to the allegedly
harmful product or substance and the onset of a plaintiffs symptoms,
combined with proof of exposure and a medical review of a plaintiffs
condition and history, may be enough to establish scientific reliability
under Rule 702.92
B. The Benefits and Drawbacks of the Low Threshold Established
in Westberry and Heller
Both Westberny and Heller take a fairly liberal approach to the in-
troduction of expert testimony in federal courts based on a differen-
tial diagnosis, and, in so doing, extend some deference to accepted
diagnostic processes and methodologies of medical and scientific ex-
perts. In fact, "[g]iven the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the flexible nature of the Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles
of the judge and the jury in evaluating the ultimate credibility of an
expert's opinion,"93 such a broad reading is called for, particularly
where the exclusion of a plaintiff's causation testimony effectively de-
cides the entire case. Also, as a practical matter, where a particular
substance or product is alleged to have caused harm to a plaintiff,
finding a pre-existing study, epidemiological or otherwise, which con-
firms or at least strongly suggests a causal connection between that
substance and a plaintiffs alleged injuries, may be next to impossi-
ble.94 In such cases, a low threshold for proving general causation, as
in Westbery and Heller, is desirable. 95
However, such an approach to general causation may lower the
threshold to a point at which dubious expert testimony could be ad-
mitted because it was sculpted merely to conform to the analysis in
Heller or Westberry. For example, under the most liberal reading of
Westberry and Heller, an expert's testimony may be admissible as long as
he or she simply reviews the patient's medical record and symptoms
and determines a close enough temporal proximity exists between ex-
posure and the onset of the patient's symptoms. 96 Although such a
view challenges the forthrightness of paid expert testimony, it is a real-
92. See Helter, 167 F.3d at 157-58; see also Westberry, 178 F.3d 264-65.
93. Heler, 167 F.3d at 155.
94. See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 264 (noting that humans rarely are "exposed to chemicals
in a manner that permits a quantitative determination of adverse outcomes" and "it is
usually difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the amount of exposure" (quoting FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 187 (1994))).
95. See id. (noting that information concerning exposure necessary to cause specific
harm is not always available).
96. See id. at 264-66: Heller. 167 F.3d at 154-58.
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istic one. Complex tort litigation cases, in which millions of dollars
may be at stake, produce judicially created thresholds for admissibility
that invariably affect the diagnosis, particularly where a diagnosis is
made during or in contemplation of tort litigation. 97 The differential
diagnosis mode of analysis may increasingly be used as a way for courts
to admit testimony which otherwise would have to be excluded under
the traditional Frye test.98 However, there are ways courts.may utilize a
differential diagnosis analysis, which lower the threshold for general
causation, while counterbalancing such leniency with stricter scrutiny
of the medical or scientific expert's evaluative process. 99
Frequently, legal scholars and practitioners argue for changes in
the requirements for expert testimony in general. 10 0 In the case of
toxic torts, one commentator argues quite forcefully that courts
should eliminate the requirement of general causation altogether. 101
The essence of the argument is that "conditioning liability on plain-
tiff's ability to prove that [the] defendant's product caused [the]
plaintiffs illness is counterproductive" because it discourages corpora-
tions from discovering dangers and informing the public.' 0 2 In addi-
tion, it is argued that eliminating proof of causation is not at odds
with fundamental principles of tort law because "eliminating causa-
tion furthers tort law's corrective justice rationale that liability [be]
linked to moral responsibility."10 3
Perhaps one of the more interesting proposals for changing the
requirements for expert medical testimony is what one commentator
terms "delinkage." 0 4 The delinkage approach would allow "clinicians
97. But see Noah, supra note 2, at 296. In his article, Professor Noah notes that one
motivation for "fudging" a diagnosis is to secure "benefits of various types from legal insti-
tutions ... in pursuit of the patient's overall welfare" as opposed to just therapeutic wel-
fare. Id. Arguably, such a rationale justifies the use of diagnosis to the benefit of the patient
in general, with no readily apparent downside for the welfare of patients. However, such an
approach inevitably triggers restrictions from such legal institutions, the burden of which is
felt by the patients legitimately injured or in need, not by those who benefited with a
markedly lesser degree of need or injury.
98. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring general
acceptance in the field in order to admit scientific evidence).
99. SeeKennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1099 (1999); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413-14 (D. Or.
1996).
100. See generally Margaret A. Berger, Essay: Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards
a New Theory ofJustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117 (1997); Noah, supra note 2.
101. See generally Berger, supra note 100.
102. Id. at 2119.
103. Id.
104. Noah, supra note 2, at 303.
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to testify only about facts elicited during the evaluative interview such
as statements by the patient, observed behaviors, and the results of
laboratory tests." 0 5 Only the fact-finder would make the ultimate in-
ferences from these facts and "[c] linicians could not testify about ulti-
mate issues or even convey their conclusory diagnostic labels which
might unduly influence the decisionmaker." 10 6 The purpose of de-
linkage would be to "encourage more careful role differentiation by
medical professionals," thereby reducing "existing incentives to gear
diagnoses toward non-therapeutic ends." 10 7
Both of the above approaches, although bold and potentially
beneficial, seem to ignore the obvious necessity of expert opinion in
complex cases, particularly toxic tort and product liability cases con-
cerning substance exposure and chemical reactions. Without expert
testimony and opinions as to causation, courts and juries would be
forced to function as defacto physicians and scientists. Accordingly, in
the case of a differential diagnosis, a more realistic approach to causa-
tion would require experts to carefully link their conclusions to their
raw data and observations at every step of the diagnosis. 1° 8
While trial judges underJoiner are required to analyze an expert's
methodology in relation to the expert's conclusions, this analysis is
typically performed in terms of an expert's ultimate conclusion, that
is, whether causation is evident or not.109 Courts that recognize differ-
ential diagnosis as a valid basis for the admission of expert medical
testimony effectively lower the threshold for general causation. 1 0
Therefore, a valid differential diagnosis should include a specific
linkage of how and why an expert "ruled out" other possible causes of
plaintiffs injuries to such a degree that the specific cause of plaintiff's
injuries was evident.'' While the Westberry and Heller courts recog-
nized this requirement, the "rule out" threshold was easily met in both
cases based on conclusory testimony by the experts, not on testimony
that provided medical or scientific linkage or serious explanations for
105. Id. at 304.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
109. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997).
110. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996) (noting
that differential diagnosis cannot address the issue of general causation).
111. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1099 (1999); Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1994);
Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1414.
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either ruling out or ruling in particular causes. 112 In short, because
differential diagnosis testimony is subject to a lower threshold for
proving general causation, the specific causation requirement of "rul-
ing out" other potential causes, which effectively requires some obser-
vation as to how the expert "ruled in" a cause, should be closely
scrutinized. As discussed below, a reading of Ninth Circuit case law
reveals a variation on this rule for the admission of expert testimony
based on a differential diagnosis. 1 13 This variation effectively elimi-
nates the traditional requirement of general causation, simultaneously
heightening the requirements of specific causation.1 1 4
HIl. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based on a
Differential Diagnosis in the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has never used the term "dif-
ferential diagnosis." In district court cases within the Ninth Circuit,
the term appears only in a handful of cases." 5 Indeed, Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp. 1 1 6 is the only district court case in the entire jurisdic-
tion that discusses, at length, the admissibility of medical causation
testimony based on a differential diagnosis.117 Although the Ninth
Circuit has never explicitly rejected or validated expert causation testi-
mony based on a differential diagnosis, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.,118
it effectively recognized its use as a reliable methodology. 119 In fact,
Westberry cited Kennedy for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit ac-
cepts causation testimony based upon a reliable differential diagno-
sis. 120 Furthermore, both the analysis in Kennedy and other cases
112. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding plain-
tiff's expert's testimony was sufficient even though he did not offer detailed explanations
for why he ruled out possible causes of plaintiff's illness); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB,
178 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting plaintiff's expert merely "considered and ex-
cluded" other potential causes without any analysis of how, exactly, other causes were ruled
out).
113. See discussion infra Part III.
114. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1228-30; Claar, 29 F.3d at 501-02; Hal4 947 F. Supp. at
1413-14.
115. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-3015-AA7M, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15028, at *35 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947
F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
116. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
117. See id. at 1413-14 (excluding the physician's expert testimony which "by itself, as
part ... proof of general causation because a single differential diagnosis is a scientifically
invalid methodology for such a purpose").
118. 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998).
119. See id. at 1228-30.
120. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1999).
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within the Ninth Circuit, clarifying Rule 702's judicial gatekeeping
function under Daubert and its progeny, establish a fair and reliable
approach to the admission of differential diagnosis testimony. 121
Hall involved product liability claims against a number of breast
implant manufacturers for injuries the plaintiffs allegedly suffered as a
result of silicone gel breast implants.12 2 The defendants filed a num-
ber of motions in limine seeking to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testi-
mony,123 which included testimony purporting to establish a causal
link between the breast implants and the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. ' 24
A treating physician of one of the plaintiffs was prepared to testify, "on
the basis of differential diagnosis, that [the plaintiff] suffer[ed] from
systemic sclerosis sine scleroderma, manifested by her pulmonary fi-
brosis, as a result of having silicone gel breast implants."'125 After not-
ing that testimony on the issue of causation requires both general and
specific causation, the court stated that "differential diagnosis does
not by itself prove the cause, even for the particular patient. Nor can
the technique speak to the issue of general causation. Indeed, differ-
ential diagnosis assumes that general causation has been proven for
the list of possible causes it eliminates."'126
However, general causation issues aside, the court applied a
stricter admissibility standard than Westbemy and Heller and concluded
that the physician's testimony was inadmissible to prove specific causa-
tion because he failed to testify as to "how he eliminated other poten-
tial causes of [the plaintiffs] symptoms."'1 27 The testimony also failed
the relevancy prong of the Daubert test because, without general causa-
tion, any specific causation evidence is irrelevant.12 8 Finally, the court
granted all of the defendants' motions in limine regarding plaintiffs'
general causation testimony and held that all other expert testimony
regarding specific causation was moot. 129
Hall took a different theoretical approach to the admissibility of
causation evidence based on differential diagnosis than Westbeny and
121. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1228-30; Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499,
501-02 (9th Cir. 1994); Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1413-14.
122. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1391.
123. See id. at 1392 n.7.
124. See id. at 1392-95.
125. Id. at 1412.
126. Id. at 1413.
127. Id. at 1414.
128. See id. at 1413.
129. See id.
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Heller, the most recent leading cases on the subject. 13 0 Hall extended
little deference to the expert opinion of medical professionals. 3 1 In
fact, by characterizing the physician's testimony as unreliable, in part
because "his conclusion [was] inconsistent with the epidemiology for
classical diseases,"'1 2 the court gave the nod to the traditional Frye test,
which requires general acceptance for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. However, Halts strict approach to a differential diagnosis is
potentially dysfunctional. Indeed, where Westberry and Heller may ex-
tend too much deference to medical experts by lowering the thresh-
old for both general and specific causation, 133 Hall seems to maintain
traditional general causation requirements while raising the scrutiny
of specific causation beyond that of Westberny and Heller.134 If followed
by other courts, the Hall approach would place undue burdens on
plaintiffs unable to find epidemiological or other studies that link a
substance or product to the plaintiffs symptoms.135 In such cases, a
plaintiff would not get beyond a defendant's summary judgment
motion.
In addition, Hall rejected the expert's differential diagnosis testi-
mony even though the expert asserted scientific theories to support
both general and specific causation. 136 Thus, plaintiffs, under Hall,
would have to show general causation definitively via other studies
and establish specific causation by explaining how the expert ruled out
other potential causes. 13 7 This approach makes it unlikely that a plain-
tiff would be able to introduce even specific causation evidence based
on a differential diagnosis in the absence of general causation and a
delineation of how other potential causes were ruled out by the ex-
pert. 3 8 As such, the Hall approach would discourage, wholesale, the
use of differential diagnosis in expert testimony, abridging the liberal
130. Westberry and Heller admitted expert testimony without a showing that the sub-
stance at issue caused the alleged injuries in general. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167
F.3d 146, 153-59 (3d Cir. 1999); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 264-66
(4th Cir. 1999). Hall, however, required a showing that the substance at issue caused, in
general, the alleged injuries. See 947 F. Supp. at 1413-14.
131. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1414.
132. Id.
133. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 152-59; Westberry, 178 F.3d at 264-66.
134. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1414 (requiring expert to show how other potential causes
were ruled out). But see Heller, 167 F.3d at 156; Westberny, 178 F.3d at 264-66 (both requir-
ing expert merely to rule out other potential causes without any requirement that the
expert explain how the other causes were ruled out).
135. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
136. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1413-14.
137. See id. at 1414.
138. See, e.g., id. at 1413-14.
Winter 2001 ]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the relatively flexible
Daubert standards.' 39
Hall has never been criticized or even distinguished in the Ninth
Circuit. 140 However, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.,'4 ' the Ninth Circuit
effectively painted over much of the Hall analysis in regard to differen-
tial diagnosis and created a workable and fair standard for assessing
the admissibility of causation evidence based on a differential diagno-
sis. 142 Kennedy involved a product liability action against the defendant
corporation and its employees for alleged injuries sustained by the
plaintiff following injections of the defendant's medical product,
Zyderm.143 The plaintiff claimed that she developed "atypical systemic
lupus erythematosus (SLE), a debilitating and incurable autoimmune
disease, as a result of the Zyderm [collagen] injections."1 4 4 The plain-
tiff sought to introduce the affidavit of an expert that established cau-
sation.' 45 In forming his opinion, the expert relied "upon a variety of
objective, verifiable evidence,"' 46 including: (1) an examination of the
plaintiff; (2) the plaintiffs medical history; (3) her medical laboratory
tests; and (4) her medical reports. 14 7 The district court rejected the
expert's testimony because the expert had not relied on any specific
epidemiological or animal studies proving Zyderm causes SLE and be-
cause there existed no consensus in the medical community on the
issue.' 48 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the
testimony was reliable, and therefore admissible, because it "was based
on [the expert's] knowledge of a general connection between colla-
gen and various autoimmune disorders, combined with [the expert's]
observation of [the plaintiffs] injuries and her medical history and
139. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 & n.12
(1993); see also Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that causation need not be established to a high degree of certainty for expert testimony to
be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1099 (1999).
140. But see Pick v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1157 n.18 (E.D. La.
1997) (criticizing the ruling in Hall that under Daubert "expert testimony at trial relating to
the existence and causation of silicone-related autoimmune disease was inadmissible on
the basis that [such a conclusion was] at best an untested hypothesis").
141. 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998).
142. See id. at 1228-30.
143. See id. at 1227. "Zyderm is a substance made from the skin, tendons, and connec-
tive tissue of bovine animals." Id. It is injected into facial wrinkles for cosmetic reasons,
namely to create a smoother appearance. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1228.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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laboratory tests."'149 Significantly, the court found that the lack of stud-
ies linking Zyderm *to SLE did not prevent admission of the expert
testimony: "The fact that A cause-effect relationship between Zyderm
and lupus in particular has not been conclusively established does not
render [the expert's] testimony inadmissible."'150 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court "abused its discretion in ex-
cluding [the expert's] testimony.' 1 51 Therefore, the plaintiff was able
to avoid summary judgment because the expert's testimony was suffi-
cient "to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Zyderm
caused [the plaintiffs SLE] .152
The expert testimony addressed in Kennedy was based on a differ-
ential diagnosis-the testimony relied on a physical examination of
the patient, her medical history, and laboratory tests.' 53 On the basis
of these diagnostic steps, the plaintiffs expert concluded that the de-
fendant's collagen product was both the general cause 154 and specific
cause of the plaintiffs autoimmune disorder. 55 On the facts of the
case, Kennedy appears to overrule Halts conclusion that a differential
diagnosis can never satisfy general causation. 156 Because no cause and
effect relationship between Zyderm and SLE was established to a de-
gree that would satisfy general causation, the admissibility of the ex-
pert's differential diagnosis to prove causation effectively negates the
traditional threshold requirement of general causation. 57 This ap-
proach allowed the expert testimony to be admitted based only on the
quality of the specific causation evidence. 58 Because the court re-
ferred to the specific causation requirement only in passing and by
implication, the degree to which specific causation is required in dif-
149. Id. at 1229-30.
150. Id. at 1230.
151. Id. at 1227.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 1228; cf Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 807 (3d Cir.
1997) (explaining that the "elements of a differential diagnosis may consist of the perform-
ance of physical examinations, the taking of medical histories, and the review of clinical
tests, including laboratory tests").
154. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1229. Although the experts did not show by epidemiologi-
cal or animal studies that Zyderm is a proven cause of autoimmune problems, they used
other information and data indicating that the active ingredient in Zyderm produces
autoantibodies. See id. at 1229. They also presented other evidence that may indicate a link
between Zyderm's active ingredient and autoimmune diseases. See id.
155. See id. at 1229-30.
156. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1414 (D. Or. 1996).
157. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1229-30.
158. See id. at 1228-29.
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ferential diagnosis testimony is unclear in the Ninth Circuit.15  How-
ever, based on the district court's analysis in Hall and the prevailing
view of Daubert's judicial gatekeeping function in the Ninth Circuit,160
a standard emerges which would require fairly strict scrutiny of spe-
cific causation evidence based on a differential diagnosis.' 6' Further-
more, because Kennedy effectively eliminates the traditional
requirement of general causation for the admissibility of differential
diagnosis testimony, 162 a stricter scrutiny of specific causation in such
cases is required as a matter of policy.
In Claar v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., m63 the Ninth Circuit
interpreted Daubert's judicial gatekeeping function to mean that dis-
trict courts are "both authorized and obligated to scrutinize carefully
the reasoning and methodology underlying" an expert's testimony. 164
The court explained that this requirement means district courts have
to determine that experts "arrived at their conclusions using scientific
methods and procedures, and that those conclusions were not mere
subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation."' 165 Hall takes this judi-
cial gatekeeping function even further, stating "Claar itself makes
clear that the court must scrutinize the validity of the reasoning lead-
ing to the experts' conclusions, if not the conclusions themselves."'' 66
Indeed, based on the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Daubert, Hall's
strict approach to specific causation in the case of a differential diag-
nosis makes sense. 167 Although Kennedy carved out a different ap-
proach to testimony based on a differential diagnosis, it did not
address the issue of specific causation, that is, "ruling out" other po-
tential causes. Therefore, under Ninth Circuit law, the Daubert stan-
159. See id. at 1228-30.
160. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1228-30; Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1399 n.29, 1413-14; see also
discussion infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
161. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1228-30; Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1413-14.
162. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230.
163. 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994).
164. Id. at 501.
165. Id. at 502.
166. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 n.29 (D. Or. 1996); see
also David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2165-66 (1994) (stating that Daubert not
only allows, "but requires, courts to determine whether an expert's extrapolations from
underlying studies or data are proper, or whether the expert has committed scientific or
mathematical errors").
167. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1414. Although Halls approach to differential diagnoses
was not very useful because it maintained both general and specific causation, Kennedy's
reduction of the general causation threshold in the case of a differential diagnosis tempers
the application of Hall's specific causation requirement. See id.
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dard, as enunciated in Claar, applies to the requirement of specific
causation where a differential diagnosis is offered to prove causa-
tion.1 68 In short, in the Ninth Circuit, expert causation testimony
based on a differential diagnosis is admissible when: (1) the expert
rules out other potential causes of a plaintiffs condition;169 and (2)
the elimination of other potential causes is founded on more than
"subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation. '"1 70
However, there are other factors that should affect the admissibil-
ity of causation evidence in federal courts based on a differential diag-
nosis. First, as a matter of policy, because the requirement of general
causation is effectively eliminated for a differential diagnosis, 71 the
standards for proving specific causation enunciated in Claar and Hall
should be carefully scrutinized.172 Otherwise, plaintiffs may gain an
unfair advantage in litigation because the differential diagnosis testi-
mony of one expert could prove causation based only on minimal in-
dicia of general causation and a "ruling out" of potential causes. 173
The proliferation of well-manufactured differential diagnostic testi-
mony is foreseeable in cases where the substance or product is un-
likely the causal agent. Therefore, to counterbalance the liberalization
of general causation requirements, courts should closely scrutinize the
entirety of an expert's methods and conclusions regarding specific
causation, using Claar and Hall as a baseline measurement of
reliability.
Second, at least one district court case after Kennedy has consid-
ered factors that may limit the application of the Ninth Circuit's stan-
dards for the admissibility of differential diagnoses. In Hickman v.
Sofamor-Danek Group,174 the plaintiff brought a product liability action
for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants' spinal
fixation systems, which were anchored with bone screws into the pedi-
168. See Claar, 29 F.3d at 501-02.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 502. Because the expert in Kennedy relied to some degree on tentative data
linking products similar to Zyderm to symptoms similar to the plaintiffs disease, courts still
may require some evidence of "ruling in" a cause (i.e. minimal indicia of general causa-
tion), but not to the degree of the traditional requirements of general causation enunci-
ated in Hall and Claar. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1099 (1999).
171. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1230.
172. See Claar, 29 F.3d at 501-02; Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1399 n.29, 1413-14.
173. See Kennedy, 161 F.3d at 1228-30; Claar, 29 F.3d at 501-02; Hall, 947 F. Supp. at
1413-14.
174. No. C 95-01095 CW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4384 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1999).
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cles of the plaintiff's spine. 175 The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had no evidence of medi-
cal causation. a76 The district court granted the defendants' motion
because it found that neither of the plaintiff's witnesses-an anesthe-
siologist specializing in pain management and a psychiatrist specializ-
ing in pain medicine with experience in neuropharmacology-were
qualified to provide expert testimony about whether the defendants'
spinal implant devices caused the plaintiff's pain.177 The court further
reasoned that even if the plaintiff's witnesses were qualified to offer
expert testimony on the issue of causation, neither had "provided any
evidence that he used an identifiable methodology for reaching his
conclusions, or that any such methodology was sufficiently scientifi-
cally reliable to satisfy the requirements for expert scientific testimony
under Daubert."178 Although both experts reached their conclusions
about the cause of the plaintiffs pain based on a review of the plain-
tiff's medical records and a review of studies assessing the risks and
benefits of internal spinal fixation, neither expert physically examined
the plaintiff.179 However, they did rely on "pain questionnaires" filled
out by the plaintiff.' 80 Significantly, the court also noted that both of
the plaintiffs experts formed their opinions for the sole purpose of
litigation. 181
Whether Hickman involved a differential diagnosis is unclear. As-
suming, however, that the expert testimony in Hickman was based on a
differential diagnosis, the analysis potentially augments the Kennedy-
Hall-Claar synthesis. Hickman raised the issue of whether the manner
in which an expert examined a plaintiff can invalidate the differential
diagnosis as an unreliable methodology. 8 2 Although at least one of
the experts based his causation conclusions on medical reports, a sur-
vey of literature on the subject, and the plaintiffs questionnaire, the
court deemed the conclusions inadmissible. 18 3 If, indeed, this meth-
odology constituted a differential diagnosis, then the examination of
specific causation by the court extended beyond the mere "ruling out"
of other possible causes, and addressed the context of the differential
175. See id. at *1.
176. See id. at *2.
177. See id. at *3.
178. Id.
179. See id. at *25-26 & n.4.
180. See id.
181. See id. at *25.
182. See id, at *25-26.
183. See id at *28.
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diagnosis. This position was further supported when the court took
specific notice of the fact that both experts formed their causation
opinions solely for the purposes of litigation, 18 4 suggesting that the
trial court has discretion to include the non-medical or non-scientific
context in its assessment of specific evidence based on a differential
diagnosis.
Conclusion
The problem of specialized expert testimony in the federal courts
will persist. Because the causation issues generally make or break a
case at the summary judgment stage, the use of expert medical testi-
mony to prove causation complicates much litigation, which accord-
ingly leads to increased amounts of time and higher litigation costs. A
downturn in such litigation practice is unlikely. The law is rapidly
evolving on the issue of admissibility of expert causation testimony
based on a differential diagnosis. Indeed, in just the last few years,
many circuits have established a fairly new approach to the admission
of testimony based on a differential diagnosis, which allows for lower
general causation standards and, in a few circuits, easier specific cau-
sation thresholds. The Ninth Circuit approach to causation testimony
based on a differential diagnosis is still developing. By effectively elim-
inating the traditional general causation requirements and, as a coun-
terweight, imposing strict specific causation standards, the Ninth
Circuit approach to testimony based on a differential diagnosis func-
tions as a reliable, useful, and fair standard by which to appraise the
admission of medical and scientific causation evidence in federal
courts.
184. See id. at *25.
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